

The Ideological Architecture of the Dutch Radical-Conservative Network around Forum for Democracy

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Introduction

The political positioning of the Dutch Forum for Democracy (FVD) is difficult to understand if it is reduced to the proposition that the party is simply “pro-Russian.” That description captures an important feature of its foreign-policy orientation, but it misses the deeper ideological construction in which Russia occupies a particular position.

A more useful interpretation is to regard FVD as part of a transnational radical-conservative intellectual formation. Its central concepts include sovereignty, anti-globalism, civilizational particularism, rejection of liberal universalism, hostility toward supranational institutions, opposition to American hegemony, cultural traditionalism, and the idea of a multipolar world order. These concepts have a genealogy that reaches from the German Conservative Revolution of the interwar period through Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger, Alain de Benoist and the French Nouvelle Droite to Aleksandr Dugin’s Eurasianism and “Fourth Political Theory.” Jussi Backman’s analysis of this genealogy provides an unusually useful conceptual framework for understanding the political language that has subsequently appeared around FVD.

The important analytical question is therefore not simply whether Moscow “controls” FVD. Public evidence does not establish that proposition. The stronger and more interesting question is whether FVD has become part of a transnational ideological and political environment in which Russian geopolitical interests, European radical conservatism and a common critique of liberal modernity reinforce one another.

The evidence suggests that this second proposition deserves serious consideration.

1. From conservatism to radical conservatism

The term “conservative revolution” is important because it describes a political position that is neither simply conservative nor conventionally reactionary. The German Conservative Revolution of the Weimar period rejected liberal democracy, liberal individualism and the Enlightenment conception of linear progress, while simultaneously rejecting a simple restoration of monarchy, aristocracy or the old order. It was therefore “revolutionary” precisely because it sought a new political order based on supposedly permanent historical and cultural principles.

This distinction is crucial for understanding the contemporary European radical right.

The underlying proposition is not:

“Return to the past.”

It is:

“The existing modern order has exhausted itself; a different political and cultural order must emerge.”

That structure is visible in Heidegger’s concept of an “other beginning.” Backman shows how the later Heidegger interpreted Western history as a movement toward the completion of Western metaphysics. Modernity culminates in Nietzsche, where the world becomes increasingly understood through the will and activity of the subject. The subsequent possibility is a new beginning based not on universal abstractions but on historical situatedness, finitude and particularity.

This philosophical construction becomes politically significant because it provides a way of attacking liberalism without simply arguing against individual liberal policies.

Liberalism itself becomes the historical expression of a deeper metaphysical error.

That is the decisive ideological move.

2. The enemy is not merely the EU: it is “the Same”

Alain de Benoist’s contribution is particularly important here. According to Backman, de Benoist interprets liberal universalism, individualism and the modern market order as manifestations of what he calls the “ideology of the Same.” The argument is that liberal modernity systematically dissolves historically constituted differences between communities and replaces them with one universal model of the autonomous, rational and self-interested individual.

De Benoist therefore does not merely say that the European Union is inefficient or that national governments should have greater powers.

The deeper argument is that universalism itself is suspect.

Human rights become suspect because they claim universal validity. Individualism becomes suspect because it detaches people from historically constituted communities. Liberal capitalism becomes suspect because it reduces social relations to rational economic exchange. Multicultural

liberalism becomes suspect because it seeks coexistence through a universal political framework rather than through differentiated cultural communities.

De Benoist's alternative is ethnopluralism: distinct cultural communities should preserve their particular identities rather than being assimilated into a universal model. Backman identifies ethnopluralism as one of the central political conclusions drawn from the Heideggerian critique of modernity.

This conceptual structure matters enormously for contemporary European politics because it allows a radical-right political position to distance itself rhetorically from classical biological racism while retaining a strong theory of cultural separation.

The political vocabulary changes:

race becomes culture;

nation becomes civilization;

nationalism becomes sovereignty;

assimilation becomes homogenization;

liberal universalism becomes "globalism";

and geopolitical hegemony becomes "unipolarity."

The underlying opposition remains a conflict between universalism and particularism.

3. Dugin transforms cultural particularism into geopolitics

Aleksandr Dugin takes this conceptual structure one step further.

According to Backman, Dugin explicitly treats Heidegger as a major intellectual foundation of his radical-conservative project. His concept of the "other beginning" becomes the philosophical justification for a political order beyond liberalism, communism and fascism.

Dugin's "Fourth Political Theory" rejects the three dominant political ideologies of the twentieth century while attempting to extract particular elements from each: freedom from liberalism, anti-capitalism from Marxism and ethnoparticularism from fascism, while rejecting their universalistic or allegedly totalizing forms.

The resulting political vision is civilizational and multipolar.

The world is no longer imagined as a collection of sovereign individuals governed by universal norms. It becomes a collection of distinct historical civilizations, each entitled to develop according to its own cultural and spiritual principles.

This is precisely where the philosophical genealogy becomes geopolitically useful for Russia.

Russia can present itself not simply as a nation-state but as a civilization.

The conflict with the United States consequently becomes more than a conventional geopolitical conflict. It becomes a struggle between competing civilizational orders.

Dugin's Eurasianism therefore provides a political vocabulary in which Russian geopolitical interests can be presented as the defence of civilizational pluralism against American-led universalism.

This is the ideological structure into which the FVD discourse repeatedly fits.

4. FVD's vocabulary: sovereignty, globalism and multipolarity

FVD's own publications provide unusually clear evidence of this conceptual vocabulary.

In October 2022, FVD published an article entitled "Russia as a serious challenger to the globalist world order." The party described the conflict in Ukraine as an ideological confrontation with an "American Imperium of globalists" and concluded that it was becoming difficult not to sympathize with Russia as "the champions of the multipolar world."

This is not conventional Dutch conservatism.

The conceptual structure is:

American power = globalism;

globalism = threat to sovereignty;

Russia = challenger to globalism;

multipolarity = alternative to globalism;

therefore Russia's geopolitical resistance becomes potentially compatible with the defence of Dutch sovereignty.

FVD's formulation is particularly revealing because the party does not primarily justify sympathy for Russia by appealing to Russian nationalism. It justifies it through opposition to the "globalist" order.

That distinction is fundamental.

Russia is useful to this ideological construction because it can be presented as the geopolitical antagonist of the system FVD rejects.

In December 2022, Baudet similarly argued that the Netherlands should put its own interests first and rejected the prevailing Western interpretation of the war. FVD's formulation was that "NATO has provoked for years" with the aim of producing a war against Russia on Ukrainian territory.

Baudet's parliamentary interventions show the same construction. In a debate concerning NATO expansion he described the accession of the Baltic states as "a deed of aggression" toward Russia and characterized NATO's eastern expansion as part of a "globalist, neoconservative" attempt to construct a new world order.

The key term is not Russia.

It is "globalism."

Russia becomes the counter-pole.

5. The civilizational reinterpretation of Ukraine

The FVD interpretation of Ukraine provides an even clearer example.

In parliamentary debate Baudet questioned whether Ukraine should be understood as a nation-state at all, describing it instead as a "conglomerate" containing fundamentally different peoples and regions.

This argument has a specific theoretical implication.

If Ukraine is primarily understood as a historically heterogeneous territory rather than as a sovereign national political community, then the conventional principle of territorial sovereignty becomes relativized.

The question becomes:

Who has the right to determine the political future of a territory containing several cultural identities?

The liberal-national answer is: the citizens of the sovereign state.

The civilizational-particularist answer can become: the historically constituted cultural communities and the larger civilizational space to which they belong.

This is precisely the conceptual territory in which Eurasianist arguments become politically useful.

It also helps explain why the distinction between “Russia versus Ukraine” and “Russia versus the West” becomes so important.

The second framing transforms the war from Russian aggression against a sovereign neighbour into a conflict between geopolitical blocs.

FVD’s July 2022 Ukraine symposium is revealing in this respect. It featured Baudet, John Laughland, journalist Joost Niemöller, Russian ambassador Alexander Shulgin and FVD European Parliament member Marcel de Graaff. The programme explicitly presented the conflict through the question “Russia or Ukraine: who is the aggressor?”

Joost Niemöller’s contribution went even further by explicitly presenting Dugin’s multipolarism as the intellectual alternative to “liberal world domination.” His FVD-hosted presentation described the rise of Eurasia and argued that Putin had embraced Eurasian and multipolar thinking.

This is particularly significant because it is not an accidental similarity in rhetoric.

Dugin is explicitly named.

Multipolarism is explicitly named.

Eurasianism is explicitly named.

And the presentation takes place within an FVD political event.

6. John Laughland as an ideological intermediary

John Laughland is particularly important because he occupies a position between political theory, European radical conservatism and FVD’s international organisation.

FVD itself identifies Laughland as director of FVD International.

His significance is not simply that he is sympathetic to Russia. His political career connects several intellectual environments.

Investigative reporting by Follow the Money documented Laughland's longstanding opposition to European integration, his involvement with Russian-connected organisations and his contacts with figures in Russian conservative networks. The investigation describes his earlier work at the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation in Paris and his contacts with figures such as Vladimir Yakunin and Konstantin Malofeev.

FTM's central conceptual finding is especially relevant: Russian influence does not necessarily require a recruited agent. It can work through what the investigation calls "enablers"—people who already share the relevant ideological assumptions and therefore propagate compatible narratives autonomously.

That distinction is critical.

An ideological network does not require command-and-control.

Indeed, it may work better without it.

Laughland's own publications illustrate the mechanism. In February 2024, writing for FVD, he asserted regarding Nord Stream:

"We now know that the Americans did it."

He then used uncertainty about Navalny's death to question the dominant Western interpretation of Russian repression. The important point is not whether every individual claim is correct or incorrect. It is the repeated epistemological structure: Western governments and mainstream media are presumed unreliable, while alternative explanations are granted extraordinary credibility.

This creates a political epistemology of permanent suspicion.

The West is not merely wrong.

The West is systematically deceptive.

7. Conspiracy as an epistemological system

This is another major ideological component.

The FVD worldview frequently organizes political reality through hidden agency:

the "globalists";

the "deep state";

the WEF;
American intelligence;
NATO;
globalist elites;
mainstream media;
international institutions;
supranational bureaucracies.

Baudet's parliamentary description of Ukraine as a "stronghold of the American deep state" and as a mechanism through which American elites allegedly pursue their interests is a particularly explicit example.

This is important because conspiracy theory here is not merely a collection of isolated claims.

It functions as a theory of causation.

Complex political outcomes are explained by identifying a hidden coordinating actor.

This is politically powerful because it makes contradictory evidence easier to absorb. If mainstream institutions deny the theory, their denial can itself become evidence of the conspiracy.

The result is a closed epistemological system:

1. The establishment controls the institutions.
2. The establishment therefore controls the information.
3. Information contradicting the established narrative is therefore suspect.
4. Alternative information becomes more credible precisely because the establishment rejects it.

Such systems are particularly compatible with geopolitical narratives in which Russia is presented as an alternative source of truth.

8. From anti-globalism to geopolitical alignment

The most important political transformation therefore occurs when domestic cultural grievances are connected to geopolitics.

FVD's discourse repeatedly connects:

immigration;

LGBT politics;

climate policy;

the WEF;

European integration;

COVID policy;

global capitalism;

American power;

NATO;

Ukraine;

and liberal democracy.

These otherwise separate issues become components of one system.

FVD's own 2022 formulation is revealing: immigration, LGBT politics, the WEF, the EU and inflation are listed together as evidence of the "globalists'" destructive influence, after which sympathy for Russia as a multipolar power is presented as understandable.

This is ideological condensation.

Many grievances become one enemy.

And once they become one enemy, a geopolitical counterforce becomes attractive.

Russia does not need to be presented as perfect.

It merely has to be presented as the strongest available counterweight.

This is one reason the expression "pro-Russian" is analytically insufficient.

The underlying political identity can be better described as:

anti-globalist → sovereignist → civilizational → multipolar → anti-American → compatible with Russian geopolitical objectives.

9. The Russian influence operation fits this ideological environment

The existence of Russian influence operations in Europe is no longer speculative.

The European Union has formally established that Viktor Medvedchuk, through associates including Artem Marchevskyi and Voice of Europe, operated influence activities in close coordination with Russian authorities. The EU states that these operations targeted European political parties and politicians and included financial resources for political actors and journalists.

The EU further states that Voice of Europe was secretly financed and directed by Medvedchuk and used to funnel resources to propagandists while building an influence network connecting Medvedchuk and his associates to European political parties.

This provides an important methodological correction.

The existence of a Russian influence operation does not prove that every politician appearing on Voice of Europe is a Russian agent.

But it establishes that Moscow-linked actors deliberately sought to construct exactly the type of political network under examination here.

The relevant question is therefore not:

“Was FVD invented by Russia?”

There is no evidence for that.

The relevant question is:

“Does an independently existing ideological network overlap with Russian influence operations, and are there people who function as bridges between the two?”

There is substantial evidence for that proposition.

10. Voice of Europe and FVD

The Dutch connection became particularly visible in 2024.

Dutch media reported that Thierry Baudet and Marcel de Graaff were associated with Voice of Europe, while de Graaff had a staff connection to Guillaume Pradoura, who became involved in the investigation. NOS reported that the Czech intelligence operation described Voice of Europe as a channel through which politicians were paid to promote Russian narratives.

Baudet rejected the allegation and pointed out that simply being interviewed by a media organisation does not establish participation in its activities. RTL likewise reported that FVD called the allegations against Baudet and de Graaff baseless.

That objection is valid as far as the evidence goes.

An interview is not proof of collaboration.

Nor does association with a Russian propaganda platform establish that the politician knew about its financing or covert function.

The significance lies elsewhere: the same political network already promoting narratives favourable to Russian geopolitical objectives was seeking relationships with European radical-right politicians.

The overlap is therefore politically significant even where individual complicity remains unproven.

11. The 2015–2017 Russian connection

The earlier history is also relevant.

Zembla and De Nieuws BV reported in 2020 that Baudet had worked closely during the Ukrainian referendum period with Vladimir Kornilov, a Russian-born political figure associated with the Moscow-based Institute of CIS Countries. Internal messages referred to payments and to Kornilov as “a Russian who works for Putin”; Baudet argued that the messages were ironic.

FVD explicitly denied the interpretation and maintained that the relevant messages had been presented without their humorous context.

Again, the evidence should not be exaggerated.

But the episode is significant because it predates the full-scale invasion by years. The relationship between the FVD political milieu and Russian-linked political actors therefore cannot simply be explained as a reaction to the 2022 war.

It belongs to a longer ideological development.

12. Laughland and the Russian conservative ecosystem

The Laughland case is even more revealing because it concerns ideological infrastructure rather than one-off contacts.

Follow the Money documented Laughland's participation in Russian conservative networks and his contacts with figures associated with Russian state and oligarchic circles. The investigation specifically identified the role of conservative, Christian and anti-gender networks associated with Russian actors such as Malofeev.

This matters because the Russian conservative project itself is not simply nationalist.

It is civilizational.

The political language of "traditional values," Christianity, anti-gender politics, anti-liberalism, sovereignty and opposition to Western decadence creates a bridge between Russian state ideology and sections of the European radical right.

Russia can then be presented as the defender of a European civilization allegedly threatened by liberal modernity.

This is precisely where Dugin's intellectual project becomes relevant.

13. The Heidegger–de Benoist–Dugin genealogy

Backman's article provides the philosophical architecture behind this phenomenon.

Heidegger's critique concerns the historical structure of Western metaphysics. De Benoist converts this into a critique of liberal universalism and develops ethnopluralism. Dugin then converts particularism into a geopolitical theory of multipolar civilization.

The chain can therefore be represented as:

Heidegger

end of Western metaphysics

↓

critique of universalism

↓

historical situatedness

↓

"other beginning"

de Benoist

critique of liberal individualism

↓

“ideology of the Same”



ethnopluralism



Nouvelle Droite / Identitarianism

Dugin

civilizational particularism



Fourth Political Theory



Eurasianism



multipolar world order

FVD

sovereignty



anti-globalism



anti-EU / anti-NATO



anti-American hegemony



multipolarity



Russia as geopolitical counter-pole

This does not mean FVD is simply a Duginist party.

It is not.

Nor does it mean that every FVD politician has studied Heidegger, de Benoist or Dugin.

Rather, it means that a recognizable ideological structure has migrated from philosophical discourse into political language.

14. FVD explicitly introduces Dugin into its political discourse

This point deserves special attention because it provides unusually direct evidence.

FVD published Joost Niemöller's presentation under the title "Dugin versus Brzezinski, East versus West." The text explicitly contrasts "liberal world domination" with Russian multipolarism and identifies Dugin's theory of civilizations as part of the intellectual explanation of the conflict.

This is not an external analyst imposing Dugin on FVD.

FVD itself published the material.

The ideological relationship is therefore demonstrable at the level of political discourse.

The question becomes not whether Dugin has influenced every aspect of FVD, but why his conceptual vocabulary is useful within FVD's political universe.

The answer is clear: Dugin supplies a geopolitical theory for the same basic opposition that FVD constructs domestically.

globalist/universalist West versus sovereign/civilizational/multipolar alternative.

15. Russia as "the other Europe"

Laughland's more recent FVD discourse makes this construction even clearer.

In 2025, FVD International published an interview in which Laughland argued that "Russia" had become a pretext for attacking European and American conservatives and described Russia as "the other Europe."

The formulation is revealing.

Russia is not represented as simply a foreign power.

It is represented as an alternative European possibility.

This is ideologically close to the civilizational conception described by Backman: political communities are understood through historically constituted cultures rather than through universal liberal principles.

Russia becomes "European" in the civilizational sense while simultaneously being positioned outside the institutional West.

That creates a powerful ideological inversion:

Russia can be anti-Western while simultaneously being presented as more authentically European than the liberal West.

16. The network is becoming institutional rather than merely rhetorical

Another important development is the institutionalization of FVD's international activities.

FVD International has its own director, publications, interviews and international network. In 2025 it promoted discussions with Russian-linked commentators and explicitly framed global politics through sovereignty and multipolarity.

FVD's ecosystem also extends beyond conventional electoral politics into what the party itself calls "metapolitics." In its own publications, FVD describes activity in education, food production, publishing, political organisation and intellectual work as part of a broader political project.

This is conceptually important.

The party is not merely attempting to win elections.

It seeks to alter the cultural environment from which political legitimacy emerges.

That is directly reminiscent of de Benoist's conception of "metapolitics": ideological transformation preceding or accompanying formal political transformation.

In this sense, the FVD project should be analysed as a movement infrastructure rather than merely as a parliamentary party.

17. The 2025 Russian political contacts

The most recent developments strengthen the case for examining the network structurally.

In 2025, former FVD MP Ralf Dekker participated in a video conference involving Russian politicians associated with United Russia. Reporting indicated that the discussion concerned an alternative European security structure and reducing NATO's influence.

The Dutch government subsequently produced an official decision memorandum concerning the issue.

Again, this does not prove Kremlin control of FVD.

But the political content is remarkable because the meeting concerns precisely the geopolitical transformation advocated within the broader multipolar discourse: an alternative European security architecture less dependent on NATO.

The ideological and geopolitical dimensions therefore converge.

18. The Laughland problem becomes even more significant

In 2025, Follow the Money reported that Laughland had repeatedly participated in Russian state-supported conferences and that Russian organisers had covered travel and accommodation. The events included forums associated with Russian governmental institutions and BRICS-related gatherings.

This is a materially different category of evidence from ideological sympathy.

It does not prove that Laughland acts under Kremlin instructions.

But it establishes continuing institutional access to Russian state-sponsored political forums while he simultaneously occupies the position of international director of FVD.

That makes him a particularly important node for network analysis.

The relevant question is therefore not whether Laughland is “a Russian agent.” That is a binary intelligence judgement for which public evidence is insufficient.

The analytically stronger question is:

What political ideas, institutions and actors become connected through Laughland’s position?

The answer includes FVD, European sovereigntism, anti-EU politics, anti-NATO discourse, Russian conservative institutions, Eurasian geopolitical thought and international conservative networks.

19. The distinction between influence and control

This distinction should remain central.

There are at least four possible relationships:

1. Direct control: Moscow gives political instructions to FVD.
2. Material sponsorship: Russian actors provide money or resources to FVD.

3. Networked influence: Russian actors create institutions and relationships that connect sympathetic European politicians and intellectuals.
4. Ideological convergence: European actors independently arrive at positions that happen to coincide with Russian geopolitical objectives.

The public evidence strongly establishes the existence of categories 3 and 4.

There is evidence relevant to category 2 in specific cases involving individuals and Russian-sponsored institutions.

There is insufficient public evidence to establish category 1 for FVD as an organisation.

This distinction prevents the analysis from becoming conspiratorial itself.

The most sophisticated model is therefore not “Moscow controls FVD.”

It is:

Russian geopolitical influence operates within an already existing European radical-conservative ideological ecosystem, and FVD occupies an important Dutch position within that ecosystem.

20. The political technology of convergence

The resulting political mechanism can be represented as a series of ideological translations.

A domestic grievance:

“Immigration destroys national identity.”

becomes:

“Globalism destroys sovereignty.”

which becomes:

“Globalist institutions such as the EU and WEF impose foreign interests.”

which becomes:

“American hegemony controls Europe.”

which becomes:

“NATO serves American geopolitical interests.”

which becomes:

“The Ukraine war is fundamentally a NATO–Russia conflict.”

which becomes:

“Russia is resisting globalist hegemony.”

which becomes:

“Multipolarity is preferable to the Western liberal order.”

This is the ideological bridge.

Once the bridge is established, support for Russian geopolitical objectives no longer needs to be justified as support for Putin.

It can be justified as opposition to globalism.

That is a much more politically effective formulation.

21. The epistemic structure: distrust before persuasion

A second mechanism is equally important.

The network does not always need to persuade people that Russia is good.

It can instead persuade them that the West cannot be trusted.

That is a lower threshold.

If NATO, the EU, governments, intelligence services, mainstream media, universities and international institutions are all interpreted as components of one corrupt ideological system, then alternative Russian narratives become comparatively credible.

This explains the importance of accusations involving “propaganda,” “censorship,” “deep state,” “globalists” and “mainstream media.”

The objective effect is epistemic:

destroy the authority of the dominant information system.

Once that authority has been destroyed, contradictory narratives can coexist without requiring a coherent alternative evidentiary system.

22. Why the Russian model benefits from ideological autonomy

This also explains why direct Kremlin control is not necessary.

A sophisticated influence operation does not require a politician to receive instructions saying:

“Say X about Ukraine.”

If the politician already believes:

- NATO is fundamentally aggressive;
- the EU is fundamentally anti-democratic;
- American power is imperial;
- globalism destroys sovereignty;
- Western media systematically lie;
- Russia represents an alternative civilization;
- multipolarity is desirable;

then Russian strategic narratives can be reproduced without direct instruction.

This is precisely why the concept of the “enabler” is analytically useful in the FTM investigation of Laughland.

The political actor remains autonomous.

The geopolitical effect can nevertheless be highly compatible with Russian interests.

23. The limits of the argument

Several conclusions should explicitly be rejected.

First, the evidence does not demonstrate that FVD was created by Moscow.

Second, the available financial evidence does not demonstrate systematic Russian financing of FVD itself. Investico and De Groene Amsterdammer examined FVD financial records surrounding the 2016 Ukraine referendum and reported that they found no Russian payments in those records.

Third, appearing on Voice of Europe does not establish that a politician knowingly participated in a covert Russian operation.

Fourth, ideological similarity is not proof of operational coordination.

Fifth, criticism of NATO, the EU, American foreign policy or liberalism is not inherently Russian propaganda.

These distinctions are not qualifications that weaken the argument. They make the argument stronger.

24. The stronger conclusion

The evidence supports a more sophisticated thesis.

FVD should be understood as a Dutch node in a wider radical-conservative and sovereignist network whose intellectual architecture draws on several overlapping traditions: the Conservative Revolution, Counter-Enlightenment thought, Heideggerian anti-universalism, de Benoist's Nouvelle Droite, ethnopluralism, Dugin's Eurasianism and the contemporary concept of multipolarity.

The Russian state did not invent all these ideas.

It does not need to.

Russia has discovered that they can be strategically useful.

The ideological sequence is therefore:

Counter-Enlightenment

→ rejection of universal reason and progress

Conservative Revolution

→ revolutionary reconstruction of society around historical identity

Heidegger

→ modernity as a historically exhausted metaphysical order

de Benoist

→ liberal universalism as the “ideology of the Same”

Dugin

→ civilizational pluralism and multipolarity

FVD

→ sovereignty, anti-globalism, anti-NATO, anti-EU and Dutch participation in a multipolar order

Russian influence operations

→ institutional amplification, networking, financing of selected actors and narrative dissemination.

The last arrow should not be interpreted as proving that the preceding arrows are Russian inventions.

It means that the ideological architecture and Russian geopolitical strategy can converge.

Conclusion

The most useful description of the phenomenon is therefore not “Russian propaganda around FVD.”

That formulation is too narrow.

Nor is “FVD is a Kremlin puppet” adequately supported by the public evidence.

A better description is **a transnational radical-conservative ideological formation in which Russian Eurasianism provides an important geopolitical pole and in which Russian influence networks increasingly overlap with pre-existing European sovereignist and anti-liberal movements.**

FVD is particularly significant within this formation because it combines three elements that are usually analysed separately.

First, it has an explicit ideological critique of liberal modernity and “globalism.”

Second, it translates that critique into a geopolitical doctrine centred on sovereignty and multipolarity.

Third, it has constructed an international intellectual infrastructure through FVD International, John Laughland, international conferences, media projects and contacts with actors in European and Russian conservative networks.

The political importance of the network therefore lies less in direct Russian command than in **ideological compatibility, network formation and reciprocal reinforcement**.

The deepest ideological construction can be reduced to one opposition:

universalism versus particularism.

The liberal West represents universalism: universal rights, universal institutions, universal norms, global markets and universal models of democracy.

The alternative is particularism: sovereign states, civilizations, historical identities, traditional cultures and independent geopolitical spheres.

Heidegger supplies the philosophical critique.

De Benoist supplies the cultural-political formulation.

Dugin supplies the geopolitical formulation.

FVD supplies a Dutch political translation.

Russia supplies a powerful geopolitical actor capable of embodying the alternative.

That is why the political significance of the network cannot be adequately understood by counting Russian payments or identifying individual agents. The deeper phenomenon is the construction of an ideological space in which **anti-liberalism, anti-globalism, civilizational particularism and multipolar geopolitics become mutually reinforcing propositions**.

And that is precisely the point at which a domestic Dutch radical-conservative movement and Russian geopolitical strategy can intersect without requiring a demonstrable chain of command.

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