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Hannah Arendt on the Augustinian Concept of Love

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Abstract: This paper examines the influence of Augustine's work on Hannah Arendt's oeuvre. *Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin. Versuch einer philosophischen Interpretation* (1929), Arendt's dissertation on Augustine, is analyzed in order to understand how its key concepts continue to be operative in Arendt's later, mature works. The dissertation is relevant to the entire Arendtian oeuvre, as it deals with topics that were absorbed into Arendt's own thinking and help to identify the main nodes of her philosophical thought. This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the impact of Augustine's work on Arendt's and contributes to the understanding of her thought as a whole.

Key words: Hannah Arendt, Augustine, love, philosophy, Heidegger, Christianity, Judaism.

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This paper is based on the young Hannah Arendt's dissertation on Augustine, *Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin. Versuch einer philosophischen Interpretation* (1929) and its key concepts, which remain operative in Arendt's later, mature works, since they influence her problematics and main concepts (love, beginning, natality, world, worldlessness, memory). Augustine is one of the main inspirations for the deep structure of Arendtian thought (Kovács 2013, 361-369). In the course of Arendt's thought, which, following Éva Biró-Kaszás (2005), can be described as a movement from Christian thinkers to the question of Judaism (and from there onwards, of course), from the *vita contemplativa* to the *vita activa*, from existential philosophy to political thought, Augustine's work remains an important point of reference throughout. Augustine's thoughts also appear in Arendtian works written in different periods, either as mottos or as a passing comment. Let me quote from Hannah Arendt here in the introduction: "That it has been possible to transform Christianity and its earlier anti-political forces into a powerful and solid political institution without a total distortion of Scripture is due almost exclusively to Augustine, who (...) is probably the spiritual author of Christian politics, and certainly its greatest theoretician. In this respect, it was decisive that he, who remained firmly attached to the roots of the Roman tradition, was able to fit the Christian notion of an eternal life with the idea of a future civitas, a Civitas Dei, where people would continue to live in community even in the afterlife." (Arendt 1995, 82). Arendt's dissertation on Augustine dealt with a variety of topics, some of were absorbed into Arendt's own thinking. The dissertation is therefore relevant to the entire Arendtian oeuvre. By interpreting the dissertation, the main nodes of Arendt's philosophical thought as a whole can be better understood.

1.The doctoral dissertation. German and English versions

In the 1990s, the figure of Arendt becomes more nuanced: her early works come to the fore and the Arendtian corpus in the Washington Library of Congress is processed. The consequence is the emergence of a demand for reinterpretation of the entire oeuvre. See, e.g., Canovan 1992. In 1996, Arendt's *Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin. Versuch einer philosophischen Interpretation* (Berlin: Springer, 1929) is published in English translation as *Love and Saint Augustine*. The German and English versions of the doctoral dissertation become comparable. Hannah Arendt defended her doctoral thesis in 1928 in Heidelberg with Karl Jaspers and the thesis was published in 1929 as the last volume of the *Philosophische Forschungen* series, edited by

Jaspers. The work is translated for Macmillan Publishers in 1963 with E. B. Ashton, but Arendt does not start proofreading and revising it until 1965. She stops halfway through, and the English text is not published. The reason for her stopping was probably the Eichmann controversy, which took place between 1963 and 1966, provoked by her book *Eichman in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.* Finally, the doctoral dissertation was published in English in 1996, translated by the political thinker Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and the philosopher Judith Chelius Stark. They also relied on the Ashton translation, as well as the modifications made by Arendt. Scott and Stark, the editors of the new English version, are both scholars of Augustine and experts on Arendt's oeuvre. They see the dissertation as a link in a chain: it anticipates and illuminates a good deal of her trains of thought found in later works. As for the titles of the two editions, it should be briefly noted that there is a striking difference at first sight, perhaps not coincidentally: in the original German edition, the emphasis is on Augustine as a thinker and on the philosophical attempt to interpret his concept of love (*Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin. Versuch einer philosophischen Interpretation*), the title of the later English version is just *Love and Saint Augustine*, the reference to philosophy disappears from the title, bringing the theological dimension to the fore with the word "saint" in the title (St Augustine as a church father). Another example to support the more philosophical nature of the German text is the following quote from Arendt: "Damit ist ihre Erfüllung (die Erfüllung aller möglichen Gebote durch dilectio Liebe, die Erfüllung der Liebe) abhängig von der gratia Dei, das *posse* diligere proximum ist abhängig von der dilectio Dei" (Arendt 1929, 85). "... each possible commandment ist fullfilled by love. The fullfilment of love depends on God's grace and the *power* to love one's neighbor depends on the love of God." (Arendt94) The *posse* in the German text expresses being able to be, ability (a concept close to philosophy, going back to Aristotle and Heidegger), the editors of the German edition give the following German expression in a footnote as a translation of "*posse* diligere proximum": *das den-Nächsten-lieben-können (the ability to love one's neighbour),* which reminds of the Heideggerian *Sein-können* (being able to be). The English expression "the *power (to love)*" focuses rather on a theological aspect with its forceful connotations (e.g., in Paul the power of faith is a common expression).

Comparing the German and English texts, according to Gábor Kovács (2013), the German text shows an existential-philosophical conceptual framework, while the English version is more user-friendly. Augustinian philosophy "offered the possibilities for approaching the conceptual apparatus of existential philosophy on a silver platter", according to Gábor Kovács (op. cit.). Concepts and metaphors used in Arendt's later works (e.g., world, desert) make their first appearance in the thesis and even "the deep structure of the Arendtian mindset is revealed in outlines". In the expanded English version, concepts belonging to the conceptual

apparatus of Arendt's mature political thought are given a more prominent role, e.g., the beginning, the natality, and the world.

The driving question of the doctoral thesis is the meaning and importance of neighbour love, and whether Augustine is able to reconcile love of God (and the consequent love of self) with the love of the neighbour without diminishing the importance of hope for heaven or commitment to the world, and if so, how. The approach to the problem will have a major impact on Arendt's later theory of action and moral philosophy. The seeds of thought that Arendt planted in her dissertation were developed in her later works, especially in *The Human Condition* (1958) and *The Life of the Mind* (1978, posthumous). For Arendt, ethics cannot be reduced to moral norms; it is thinking (which, as a habit of analysis, wants to understand and scrutinize everything that happens) that prevents us from committing evil. Arendt's thinking is defined by a combination of Augustinian and Heideggerian influences, centred on a core paradox concerning the historical mystery of evil and the possibility of a new beginning for human existence. An important question is: what are the conditions for a new start?

Arendt is ambivalent about the Christian concept of love (the biblical *agape* or the Augustinian *caritas*) and about Christianity in general. It is well known that the young Arendt turned towards Jesus and early Christianity, as well as towards Augustine and Kierkegaard. Some Augustinian concepts have accompanied her throughout her life. But Christianity also represented a dangerous otherworldliness for her political thought (like in the case of Machiavelli, Rousseau and Nietzsche). Arendt was particularly interested from the beginning in how Augustine's concept of *caritas* provided a basis for a religious community and responsibility towards the other, a freely chosen attitude/ground not rooted in either natural kinship or political relations.

Augustine describes Christianization, conversion, as a conversion from the orientation towards the world/love of the world (desire for the world/*cupiditas*) to orientation towards God in the form of divine love (*caritas*), which is the free choice of unworldliness. Arendt focuses not primarily on the inner experience of transformation, but on its effects on human relationships, on interpersonal relations. Here the question of love for one's neighbour arises, and the community of believers (*civitas Dei*) is confronted with the secular community (*civitas terrena*). Who else can love their neighbour, that is, everyone, as themselves, then one who loves God, whose command and gift enables them to love their neighbour (Arendt 1996, 94)? This means that the love of one's neighbour has a unique characteristic, which is neither enjoyment (*frui*, since we can only enjoy God according to Augustine), nor use (*uti*, a model of comparison with other objects of desire). In *Civitas Dei*, the relationship between neighbours is characterised by *caritas* (love of God) and not by love of the world for its own sake (*cupiditas*). It is an obligation, a duty, that goes beyond the

obligations imposed by the considerations of mutual benefit that have traditionally underpinned contractual obligations. The new community implies a new equality based on God's grace.

2. Why Arendt chooses Augustine?

In relation to the topic of the dissertation, the question may arise as to why Arendt chooses specifically Augustine? Arendt also took theological courses, attended lectures on Kierkegaard by Romano Guardini and participated in Rudolf Bultman's New Testament seminars. However, it is striking that, as already mentioned, Augustine's name is not preceded by the word "saint" (at least not in the title of the German book), and the subtitle refers to a philosophical and not a theological inquiry. Augustine is not the subject of this dissertation as a theologian. Incidentally, the theme of Augustine comes to the fore in the work of several philosophers of the period (including the phenomenology and existential philosophy of the early 20th century). A few 20th century philosophers are mentioned below in this context, without claiming completeness. Husserl refers to Augustine at the beginning of his *Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness* (1905), and in his *Cartesian Meditations* (1931) he describes Augustine's philosophy as a forerunner of phenomenology. Heidegger refers to Augustine in several of his works (including in his magnum opus, *Sein und Zeit*): *Augustinus und Neuplatonismus* (1921, summer semester, Freiburg: the analysis of memory in Book X of the *Confessions*), in GA 60; *Der Begriff der Zeit* (In GA 64, 1924, Marburg); *Geschichte der Philosophie von Thomas von Aquin bis Kant* (1926/27, winter semester, Marburg); *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (GA 24, Vorlesungen 1923-1944); *Sein und Zeit* (1927); *Vom Wesen des Grundes (1928/1929), Das heiligen Augustinus Betrachtungen über die Zeit* (1930), *Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (1941, in GA 49). Jaspers includes Augustine in his series of portraits of the great philosophers (1956/1957). Hans Jonas, a fellow student of Arendt, publishes a paper entitled *Augustin und das paulinische Freiheitproblem* (1930). Jonas says Augustine, Pascal and Kierkegaard were hot topics in German universities at the time. Another "existentialist", the "pied-noir" (i.e., African) French writer Albert Camus, also wrote his doctoral dissertation on Augustine (*Métaphysique chrétienne et Néoplatonisme*, 1936). Around 1930, the 1500th anniversary of Augustine's death was celebrated, which may also be linked to the great philosophical and theological interest at the time. Arendt also wrote an essay in 1930, under the title *Augustin und der Protestantismus* (4 December 1930, in: *Frankfurter Zeitung*), in which she reveals memory and inner life as the essence of the Christian person. We know that Augustine is an outstanding personality also because he touches in his work both on the most external aspects of

Christianity in the organisation and teaching of the Church, and on its most intimate elements, focusing on the inner life of the individual (thus laying the foundations of the modern psychological and autobiographical novel). Arendt's essay of Augustine, published in the Frankfurter Zetiung, emphasizes that, for Augustine, the individual life of the believer is worthy of preservation in memory not because of something immanent in the believer, but because of the divine grace manifested in it (whereas for Goethe, autobiography becomes a document of autonomous self-development). In the history of European Christianity, Catholicism and Protestantism took different paths in following Augustine. Catholicism has inserted ecclesiastical authority between the confessor and God and has tried to completely usurp the Augustinian heritage. Although, through the individual inner life, Christians directly glorified God (not the Church). Luther, who was very fond of Augustine, held that the conscience is in direct contact with God.

Here I should note that in the case of Hannah Arendt, I examined the following works, tracing their Augustinian influences: *Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin* (1929, PhD dissertation); *Augustin und der Protestantismus* (4 December 1930, essay published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*ban); *The Human Condition* (1958: from the end of the '50s, Arendt's political theory – in debate with Augustine – speaks of the love of the world. The original title of *The Human Condition* was *Amor mundi/The Love of the World*. Chapter I explores the problem of plurality as a fundamental determinant of the human condition and begins with an Augustinian interpretation of the creation story. In the second chapter, the problem of love appears, and Arendt analyses the relationship between the private and the public spheres. In the section on action, the problem of love is presented in the context of forgiveness); *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* and *On Revolution* (1963: important in these is the problem of evil and the critique of goodness and pity. In the context of the French Revolution, she writes about the destructive impact of goodness and pity as emotions on the political sphere of the community, as opposed to solidarity as a political principle); *The Life of Mind* II (1978, the main theme of volume II is the will. The medieval Christian tradition, represented by Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus, sees in charity the stabilizing counterweight of the will); *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (Arendt 1995), where she repeatedly refers to Augustine's *The City of God*, analysing both the ancient and the modern concept of history. In addition to the primary bibliography, I researched secondary bibliography in Hungarian and foreign languages. I try to present some of the results of this research in this paper.

Scott and Stark, the editors of Hannah Arendt's English-language dissertation, argue that Arendt "used Augustine as a weapon" against her former lover, Heidegger, in her doctoral thesis. In the doctoral thesis, in which we find the basis of all her subsequent works, Arendt responds to

Heidegger's notions of anxiety (*Angst*), care (*Sorge*), being-towards-death (*Sein zum Tode*), *das Man* and *Jemeinigkeit* by underlining the opposite poles of human existence: birth, natality, hope, new beginnings/the child, plurality, action, *amor mundi* and the importance of memory (based on Augustine, who provides an important analysis of *memory* in the *Confessions;* the memory ensures unity and not being-towards-death or care). Arendt tries to articulate how the outcome of our actions always depends on how others act and react. From this background grows the concept of "*natality*". Just as life is given to men and women through birth (linked to hope), so every action is an absolute horizon for a new beginning/*initium*. (There are three levels of birth in Arendt's works, three perspectives:

1. pre-political level: birth into the factual world, the first appearance of the principle of the beginning;

2. political level: political birth or birth into the public sphere/ social sphere;

3. theoretical level: the third birth, the nascent character of the life of the mind. See Arendt 1958, 1998, 176–178, and Astell 2006, 373–398).

A very personal factor may also have determined Arendt's choice of topic for her dissertation: in a letter from Heidegger to Arendt from May 1925, the following quote is found: "being in love = being driven into one's most own (understanding) existence. *Amo* means, *volo, ut sis,* Augustine once said: I love you – I want you to be who you are." According to Ursula Ludz (Ludz 2002, 30–31) this quote stayed with Arendt throughout her life. Ludz also writes that, according to Alfred Kazin, this sentence led Arendt to Augustine as the subject of her doctoral thesis (Ludz 2002, 269). Heidegger and Arendt met in 1924, when the 18-year-old Hannah began her philosophical studies in Marburg and attended Heidegger's university lectures. She needed love, protection, and guidance (Hannah was half-orphaned from the age of 7, and her mother remarried, but Hannah's two stepsisters were never close with her). Heidegger, 35, became at once her lover, friend, and mentor. He was working on *Being and Time* during that period, which elevated him to the status of one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century, a married man, father of two boys. The initially very passionate, secret relationship, perhaps first mentioned by Elisabeth Young-Bruehl (1982), has gone through many twists and turns over half a century. Elzbietta Ettinger (1995, 2001) describes three stages in the relationship: 1. life as lovers and the break-up (1925–1930, in 1929, Arendt marries Austrian philosopher and writer Günther Anders, they move to Berlin, then to Paris, Arendt works for various Jewish organisations); 2. both Heidegger's and Arendt's lives are changed by national socialism and the war (1930–1950, in 1937 Arendt and Anders divorced, in 1940 Arendt married the philosopher Heinrich Blücher, and the Jewish Arendt emigrated to New York in 1941; Heidegger became rector of the University of Freiburg in 1933, resigned in February 1934); 3.

their relationship was rebuilt on Arendt's initiative (1950-1975). In a note sent to Heidegger on 28 October 1960, the then 50-year-old Arendt wrote that Heidegger was the man to whom she remained faithful and to whom she did not remain faithful, and both out of love.

Safranski writes about the love affair between Arendt and Heidegger in the following way (Safranski 2000, 209): "During the summer vacation of 1924, while Heidegger is in Todtnauberg, Hannah returns to her family in Konigsberg and there composes a lightly encoded self-portrait and sends it to Heidegger. She is tormented by a feeling of not being really present in this relationship. She must not show herself. But in her 'Shadows' – the title of her text – she intends to reveal herself at last. She tries to find a language for the 'extraordinary and magical' that has just happened and that has split her life into a 'Here-and-Now' and a 'Then-and-There'. She calls her love an 'unbending devotion to a single one'. In a shadowy manner, totally dissolved into moods, Hannah Arendt sketches her inner emotions. which are dominated by the pressure of a worldless, aloof inwardness. In a text broken up by reflections, and using the detachment of the third person singular, she tells of a love that has not yet properly come into the world. There is something entirely elemental missing, something that Arendt will later, in *The Human Condition*, call the 'worldly interspace: Love, by reason of its passion, destroys the in-between which relates to us and separates us from others.' What separates the lovers from the world in which they live is that they are worldless, that the world between them has burnt away. This 'worldly interspace' is extinguished not only by passion but also by the external constraint of secrecy. Where love dares not show itself, where there are no witnesses to it, there the criterion of distinction between reality and imagination is lost. This is what depresses Hannah. (...) The secrecy, after all, was his game. (...) Arendt's devotion was a piece of luck that would not entail any responsibility for him. In his letters he kept assuring her that no one understood him so well as she did-even, and especially, in philosophical matters. In point of fact, Arendt will later demonstrate how well she understood Heidegger. She will understand him better than he understood himself. She will, in the manner of lovers, respond to and complement his philosophy, endowing it with that reality that it was still lacking. To his 'running ahead into death' she will reply with a philosophy of being born; to his existential solipsism of *Jemeinigkeit* (each-one-ness) she will reply with a philosophy of plurality; to his critique of *Verfallenheit* (helpless addiction) to the world of Man (One I They) she will reply with her amor mundi. To Heidegger's *Lichtung* (clearing) she will respond by philosophically ennobling the 'public'. Only thus does Heidegger's philosophy become an entity – but he will not notice it. He will not read Arendt's books, or only very cursorily, and what he does read will offend him."

Throughout Arendt's oeuvre, various forms of love, especially the relationship between politics and love, appear regularly.

3. Observations on content and methodology

Arendt's doctoral dissertation consists of three parts and three appendices, the first two parts containing three chapters each. The three parts are: I. Love as desire (*Amor qua appetitus*), II. Creator and creature (*Creator-Creatura*), III. Social life (*Vita socialis*). The hypothesis of the dissertation is that the essence of the Augustinian concept of love can be reached by examining the meaning and significance of the Christian command to love one's neighbour, and by exploring the relevance of the other person. In her analysis of neighbour love based on the love of God, Arendt examines what it means to love God on the one hand, and to love oneself on the other, because the relation of the converted person to himself or herself is completely changed. There is also the question of why, for a man alienated from the world and its goods, love of one's neighbour is relevant?

We can emphasize Arendt's distance from mere dogmatic questions. She is more interested in the possibility and analysis of a *pre-theological sphere*. Augustine himself acknowledged the existence, independently of divine revelation, of the law "do not do to others what you do not wish for yourself" "engraved in our hearts". The Christian commandment confirms this natural law. The pre-theological analysis is carried out by Arendt in the first chapters of the first two parts. According to Éva Biró-Kaszás, Heidegger's pre-ontological analysis in *Being and Time* and the analysis of the pre-Christian content in *Phenomenology and Theology* could have served as her model. In the second chapters Arendt tries to reveal the new elements. An examination of the various concepts of love can provide criteria for deciding upon the authenticity or inauthenticity of the being-there before God. According to Arendt, this question is not necessarily decided before God. Arendt also points out that the late ancient philosophical concepts never disappeared from Augustine's thinking, and that he effectively tries to solve Christian problems with Neoplatonic, mainly Plotinian elements. Augustine replaces the Platonist doctrine that the highest good for man is to see God with a Christian ethic based on the Incarnation, according to which sin is the only thing that separates God and man, and only God can remove it (man has no role in this). But the surest steppingstone to God's love is neighbour love. John Burnaby wrote: (*Amor Dei. A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine,* 1938, 91): "Considering neighbour love as a 'stepping stone' to God's love, we again come close to Platonism, since according to the order of love (*ordo amoris*), every love has its corresponding degree." (Burnaby 1939, 91) We will return to the order of love later.

Arendt's method, according to Biró-Kaszás, combines phenomenological, existential-philosophical, and de(con)structurionist elements.

a) As a disciple of Husserl, Heidegger, and Jaspers, Arendt takes a phenomenological approach to the topic, believing that love, will, and consciousness are always directed towards something, are intentional, and can therefore be the subject of a phenomenological research. The questions that preoccupy Arendt arise from her reflection on the experience of God, the self, and the world. In 1931, Husserl's *Cartesian Meditions* is published, in which he interprets Augustine's philosophy as a forerunner of phenomenology.

b) Éva Biró-Kaszás (2005, 45) also talks about a de(con)structive reading, meaning a repetitive, dialogical relationship: Arendt questions the Augustinian text, and by destroying the tradition, she highlights the once motivating basic experiences. She reveals Christian and Neoplatonic elements in Augustininan's concepts of love. The types of love are different in their orientation, in their intention. Arendt also reveals contradictions. "Jaspers' method is reflected in the fact that Arendt already emphasizes in the introduction that these contradictions must be left as they are, and that there is no need to look for some system, to force the different ideas into some kind of whole. For Jaspers, the method of philosophy is, in fact, to develop a kind of illumination by exploring the underlying contradictions and the limits and boundaries, not to build a complete system." (Biró-Kaszás 2005, 46)

c) In the context of the existential-philosophical approach, we have to think about the following Augustinian questions, on which Arendt focuses. Who am I? Am I capable of action, decision? What should I do? In other words, the human condition in the world. On pages 46-47, Éva Biró-Kaszás highlights the parallel with Heidegger, who writes in *Being and Time* that "the Self and Selfhood must be grasped existentially" (Heidegger 1989, 525). The beginning of Arendt's intellectual journey was influenced by the work of Jaspers and Heidegger (German existential philosophy. One of the main questions of the doctoral thesis is: is there a point of escape from the loneliness of existence, and can it be love? Arendt sees that existence is never essentially isolated because it can only develop together with other people in a given world, within which and with which it moves, being surrounded by it. The doctoral thesis of 1928/1929 focuses on the relationship between man and the world. Man is a world-creating being (Heidegger's influence), who cannot be separated from this world (*Welt/mundus*). In the *Liebesbegriff...* (Arendt 1929, 42. note 2), she also refers to Heidegger in a footnote. The human-inhabited world is not the same as the physical universe. The axis of the interpretation is the gap between *caritas* based on death and love centred on natality and memory. Arendt wants to show how Augustine reconciles the confessional discourse of the individual journey towards the Creator with his duty towards his neighbour in the human community (*vita socialis*). Contrasting

Augustine and Heidegger, Arendt argues that it is memory that gives unity and wholeness to human existence, not the being-towards-death.

According to Csaba Olay (Olay 2008, 21–22), Arendt's method emphasizes conceptual clarification, conceptual analysis, and the elaboration of distinctions in an Aristotelian manner, complemented by placing the various uses of terms in their historical context: examining the concrete historical and political experiences from which the terms derive (conceptual history). Arendt recognized the entanglement of concepts over time, their drift away from their original layers of meaning, and marked linguistic and conceptual confusions. Arendt "elaborates and wonderfully, shall we say, unfolds the definitions. Each of her works unfolds the definitions of the subject, which are increasingly illuminating, in so far as she develops one distinction after another." (Hannah Arendt: *Ich will verstehen.* München-Zürich: Piper, s.a., 111–112. Mary McCarthy on Arendt)

Her doctoral dissertation is an excellent example of conceptual analysis, clarification and *distinctio*, where the concept of love is examined on the basis of more than forty Augustinian works (including *Confessions, On the Happy Life, On the Good of Marriage, The City of God, On Christian Doctrine, On Free Will, On Grace, On Order, Soliloquies, On the Trinity,* etc.).

Arendt explores several forms of the Augustinian concept of love, which Augustine himself did not always use consistently. Arendt makes a terminological decision towards the end of the first part: she interprets the words *amor, caritas*, and *dilectio*, which Augustine uses mostly as synonyms, in different ways, taking into account the translation of the New Testament from Greek into Latin (amor=eros, dilectio=storge, caritas=agape): *amor* is thus *appetitus*/desire, *caritas* is the relationship with the highest good, and *dilectio* is the relationship with oneself and the world (originating from *caritas*). *Amor* as longing is therefore the most general concept of love, *dilectio* is the love of self and neighbour, *caritas* is the love of God and of the "highest good". "A life lived in *caritas* is directed towards a goal that is in principle outside the world, and therefore also outside *caritas. Caritas* is nothing other than the path that connects man with his ultimate goal." (Arendt 1929, 22) According to Éva Biró-Kaszás (Biró-Kaszás 2005, 71–75), we can summarize the forms of love in the dissertation as follows:

1. *Amor sui*: self-love, which has two different meanings: 1.1. it is the starting point of a desperate search for self ("I have become a question for myself"), 1.2. love that does not seek, originating from *caritas*, which corresponds to the order of love. In caritas, the self becomes secondary because of eternity, and love becomes an objective pattern of behaviour (Arendt 1929, 25–26).

2. *Appetitus*, a desire to acquire a specific object. Its true fulfillment is sight, because it leaves the beloved object unchanged (Arendt 1929, 20–21).

3. *Amor amoris Dei*: the longing for the love of God directs man towards his origin, towards the Creator. Memory plays a crucial role, revealing that a relationship with God already exists.

4. *Dilectio mundi*: the love of the world, which by our will makes the world created by God man's his home, and whose object is thus the things of the world and humans. The love of the world makes the world wordly. (Arendt 1929, 42–43).

5. *Dilectio proximi (love of neighbour, dilectio fraterna):* commands us not to do to others what we do not wish them to do to us (Arendt 1929, 26, note 2). It is a natural, pre-religious, secular law, of which there is also a Christian version.

6. *Agape*: appears only in a footnote in the dissertation (Arendt 1929, 26, note 1), is identified here with caritas by Arendt with reference to Harnack's *Der Eros in der alten christlichen Literatur*. The equality of men in the sin which descends from Adam is expressed in interdependence and mutual love (*diligere invicem*). Through the choice of *caritas*, the relationship with the other is expressed in the duty freely undertaken. "But this is not love as we understand it, which has become impossible with the detachment from the world. Mutual love does not include choice, that is, we cannot choose the object of our love." (Arendt 1929, 88). We practice mutual love because in the process we express our love of God. According to Arendt, the influence of Stoicism can be discovered in the fact that the Christian community is understood as a body and the individual as a part of the body, so that mutual love becomes self-love/*diligere seipsum* (Arendt 1929, 86–87).

3.1. Content of the dissertation. The first part

I.1. In the first part of the dissertation, Hannah Arendt explores the structure of desire/*appetitus*. It is here that the pre-theological analysis can be found. Desire is attached to the self and is directed towards something good in the world. We want to possess what we consider good. Love as *appetitus* is accompanied by the fear of not getting or losing the good things we want. For love as *appetitus*, the good is actually the absence of fear. The good most feared and desired is life itself, the loss of which through death is feared. The adequate object of love is our own life, our very existence, but we are not able to keep it because of death, which threatens it closely: "For the present, the future can only be a threat" (Arendt 1929, 10). Therefore, absolute good is nothing but the present without future, eternity. According to the *Confessions*, death was a defining experience for Augustine. It was this that led him to Pauline Christianity. Fearless possession is only possible where there is no time, which, according to Plotinus, is the same as eternity. It is man's very life that prevents him from living in the timeless present. "Even if objects were durable, human life is not. We lose it every day. The years of our lives pass

us by and wear us down to nothing." (Arendt 1929, 11). True life is eternal and identical with Being. We objectify life and eternity by thinking of it as the object of our desire.

Depending on the object of desire, Augustine speaks of *cupiditas*, the desire for temporal objects, and *caritas*, the object of which is eternity, the absolute future. The latter is true love, while the former is false, making heaven and earth, the world, disappear. We emphasize here the concepts of world and worldliness: "We call 'world' not only the raw material created by God, the heavens and the earth, but also the inhabitants of the world (...) In particular, we call the whole of those who love the world, the 'world'." (Arendt 1929, 12). Through the pursuit of worldliness (*cupiditas*) man's life remains mortal, but through *caritas* he can attain eternity (Arendt 1929, 13). For the concept of the world, see also: *Fogodzók nélkül. Hannah Arendt olvasókönyv* (2008). Here, Hannah Arendt's conversation with Günter Gauss (1964) reveals (p. 39) that Arendt understood the world then, first of all, as a space for politics, and more broadly as "the space where things become public, where man dwells, and which must look good. And in which, of course, the arts are also make their appearance." In the mere process of work and consumption, *Weltlosigkeit* (worldlessness) is outlined, in which man is really completely dependent on himself. On pp. 33–34, Arendt contrasts belonging to a natural group (e.g., by birth) with organization as always taking place in relation to the world. Those who have something in common organise themselves on the basis of what we usually call interests. Arendt considers the direct personal relationship, in which we can speak of love, and which is most fully expressed in romantic love, to be apolitical and worldless (*weltlos*): "In such a relation, the person is addressed directly and independently of his or her relation to the world. (...) I acknowledge that the Jewish people represent a model of a covenant of a people without a world, maintained for thousands of years."

In Chapter 2 of I Part, Arendt tries to capture new elements, starting from an idea of Augustine: "man is what he desires" (*Homily on the First Epistle of John* II, 14, apud Arendt 1929, 13). Unable to tolerate isolation, he tries to break out of it through love (*cupiditas* or *caritas*), by which one can make the world one's home. For those living in *caritas*, the world becomes a desert, empty and alien, not a home: "this world is a desert for believers (who do not love the world), just as it was a desert for the people of Israel. So now, before we get to the promised land, the eternal kingdom, we are in the desert, living in tents." (*On the Gospel of John* 28. 9, apud Arendt 1929, 13). "Why does the seeker see the world as a desert? How and by what is man able to live in the world without any demands, within the searching question?" – asks Arendt from Augustine (ibid.).

It is because of dissatisfaction with the world that we can see the world into which we are created as a wilderness. The world as the object of our desire is external to us, out of our power, and our striving towards it is futile. The tormenting desire would only end if we were to live next to the

object of our desire, enjoying and possessing it. In *cupiditas*, man wants the world, "to become the world by possessing the world". *Cupiditas* strives for what is beyond its power, especially for life as the highest good. The fearless possession of desired objects is limited by several factors: the temporality of our existence, our inherent isolation from our most intimate selves, our dependence (fear occurs because it is a manifestation of dependence), our lack of autonomy. In *cupiditas*, man is the servant of the world, and in this framework its opposite is *free will* and God, who is autonomy itself, the supreme being. So, here, God is not present as Creator, not as the ultimate goal of human love. Arendt does not see a Christian solution here, but – as she explains in the appendix – elements of the tradition associated with Plotinus (the definition of love as longing). Why was Augustine unable to move away from the Greek tradition, from Neoplatonism? Éva Biró-Kaszás sees several reasons for this (Biró-Kaszás 2005, 24): Augustine shared the same "sense of life" as the Neoplatonists. Indeed, all three intellectual movements that were dominant at the time, Neoplatonism, Gnosticism, and Christianity, express "an inherent dissatisfaction with the world", "alienation from the world", as does existentialism (see Hans Jonas: *Gnosticism, Existentialism and Nihilism*). Ancient nihilism expresses a state of being that entails the loss of the cosmos as a natural home, of the world and its immanent logos. In the Graeco-Roman world of early Christianity, the ideal of the polis as a whole transcending the individual lost its relevance. According to Jonas, the ambition of the gnostic man was not to 'act as a part' but, to put it in existentialist terms, to live authentically, we can only be ourselves against the world.

According to Augustine, there is a gulf between man and his world, the experience of strangeness. In this world, the human condition is characterised by an insurmountable fear of not being able to obtain the object of our desire, or of losing what we already possess. This fear can be eliminated if we eliminate desire, attachment to the world, *cupiditas*. Thus, also man's alienation from himself disappears, for he who lives in *cupiditas*, loves the world, desires its objects, is alienated from himself; and to desire a current object is to forget potential desire-objects. Desire itself is a state of oblivion; man is dissolved in the desired object and dispersed in the world that possesses him (Arendt 1929, 15). Dispersion is a form of self-forgetting (Arendt 1929, 18). Taking up the possibility of retreat as the opposite of dispersion, Augustine became "a question for himself". The search for selfhood leads to God, "self-discovery and the discovery of God coincide" (Biró-Kaszás 2005, 27). At the beginning of the search for self, man does not belong to the world, but to God, to eternity , as its innermost essence (Arendt 1929, 16). The man who retreats into himself still recognizes himself as changing, mortal, and Augustine therefore calls on us to transcend ourselves (Arendt 1929, 17 references *On True Religion*).

According to Augustine's metaphysics, God created His creatures out of nothing, and therefore they are characterized by both being and non-being (incompleteness), they are changeable. God's metaphysical essence is identical with being, his attributes are eternity, immutability (unchanging Trinity), and simplicity. The immutable is incapable of non-being, but the changeable is capable of it. The act of God gives being, not essence. When we recognize our inherent mutability, we transcend ourselves by denying the present and invalidating its meaning, through hatred of the changing, mortal self (self-hatred). This is the paradox: the true self (and love of the true self) can only be achieved through self-hatred. "We should love God by forgetting ourselves" (Arendt 1929, 18, *Sermones* 142); that is to say, man forgets and despises his own wordly past and the diversity of the world; he has to transcend the human mode of existence as such (Arendt 1929, 19). In this process, man ceases to be an individual man, to have a given "here and now", he ceases to be himself. Forgetting becomes and existential goal (Arendt 1929, 18). "transcendence occurs at the moment when the believer does not love in relation to himself, but loves his whole being. This love reaches out to the future, to the 'not yet', but the absolute future is forever separated from mortal man by a gulf. The transcending man remains isolated, since *caritas* also only mediates to God." (Biró-Kaszás 2005, 29).

Man's existence in the present is hope (if he belongs to God through *caritas*) or terror (for those who belong to this world, from which they must then part in death). Man's present life is neglected for his future. In the case of the *appetitus* concept of love, there is no indication that man is originally attached to God or to the world. According to Arendt, this love is pseudo-Christian, because the ideal of autonomy turns into self-denial, since it does not come from the consciousness of createdness (Arendt 1929, 19–20). In the case of love defined as desire, man inherently seeks something outside himself and is lost in it.

In the case of love understood as desire, Augustine speaks of two groups of objects of desire: objects of enjoyment (*frui*) and objects of use (*uti*). In the latter case, the desired object is a means to a later good. In the case of pleasure, desire ceases, and we give ourselves over to the world (*cupiditas*) or to eternity (*caritas*). However, "the world is for use, not enjoyment" (Arendt 1929, 22), and *caritas* freely "uses" the world as an instrument, reconciling with it and with life. Death is the supreme evil for the *cupiditas*, but in the love achieved through self-transcendence, in the desire for eternity, death is of no importance.

The essential questions of the second chapter of the first part is: how can Plotinus and the Christian position be read together? In Plotinus, the love and enjoyment of the earthly world is present, which can also not be indifferent for the believer, but Augustine's Christian thoughts are in some places in contrast with Plotinus' metaphysics. Plotinus could have become one of Augustine's favourite authors because of his positive

attitude towards the world, which influenced people in the 3rd century: we must find the right attitude to a world that is inherently good.

I.3. In the third chapter of the first part (*Ordinata dilectio*), Arendt confronts love defined as desire with Christian ideas. In Augustine, the person living in caritas will possess the "supreme good" and, as if "returning" from eternity, can objectively establish the order and extent of desires (love) for worldly things. In this objective order, love of the world is secondary and derivative. It is a world-transcendent point of reference that defines the existing world, things, and their relationships. After the "return", one's own life also becomes objectified, a mere thing to be used. Love according to order is not identical with love defined as desire, because the latter is determined by its object, and ordered love determines what is above us, beside us, and below us: "That which is above us is the 'highest good', and therefore must be loved for its own sake; while everything else – our own self, our neighbour, and our own body – is to be loved only according to the highest end." (Arendt 1929, 26, based on *The Christian Doctrine*). The order of love – according to Arendt 1929, 27 – means a completely different relationship to God, to my neighbour, and to myself than the relationship that arises from love as *appetitus*.

On the order of love (see Boros 2014, 49-65): Socrates still believed (see Diotima's speech) that man does not cease to strive for the good and the beautiful through the eros in him, climbing up the ladder: love of one body→ beauty discovered in many bodies→ love of state institutions, laws→ love of ideas→ contemplation of the idea of the good; from procreation in the flesh to procreation in the soul/spirit. In Augustine, the erotic impulse is divested of its orientation towards the good: man is capable of doing evil for the mere love of evil. Here, love does not emphasize something positive, but is value-neutral and unreliable for orientation. The ladder of beauty thus changes (the starting point as well as the end point): the starting point is no longer man striving upwards with erotic fervour, but man helpless without divine grace and love, unable to escape his misery alone; the end point is no longer the ideal of beauty and goodness, but divine justice. On the first rung of the Augustinian ladder of love we find the bodily things that offer pleasure mediated by the sense of touch (*Confessions* II. V, p. 63: "Gold, silver and everything else has its charms for our eyes. In touching them (*in contactu carnis*), the most important thing is the pleasure of congruence." Material creations (*corpus*) also adapt to our other senses in an appropriate way. Then comes the love of the lifeworld: " tempted by life, this life we are now living on earth, due to certain proportions of our ornate nature", then he mentions friendship between people, which is two-faced: sweet, but tempting to sin: "Sweet also is human friendship, because of the unity of many souls, through its lovely bond, but we sin if, with our disorderly inclination (*immoderata inclinatio*) towards them, we forsake the greater

and the sum of all good, you, the Lord our God, your justice and your law. Though these little things also give pleasure, it is not such as you give, my God of all creation. For in you the heart of the righteous finds its joy and the heart of the innocent its delight." Augustine contrasts disordered and immoderate inclinations (the objects of which are finite goods instead of God) with the ordered love (*ordo amoris*) that later defined the European tradition. A positive exposition of the doctrine of *ordo amoris* can be found in the first book of *On Christian Doctrine*. The order of love is not simply a series, but the order of things to be loved and the way of loving them as correctly defined objetcs of affection. The Christian doctrine is based on the commandment of love in Matthew 22:37: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets." Love for ourselves as souls, but even for our bodies, is self-evident, it does not need to be commanded, argues Augustine (Chapters 23-26, p. 63: "For only madmen doubt that man loves himself, and that he wants to be useful to himself."). According to Augustine, there can be four objects of our love: God, our self as soul, other people, and our physical self. "So, there are four things we should love (*diligere*): the first is that which is above us, the second is ourselves, the third is that which is beside us, and the fourth is that which is below us." (Chapter 23, 59.)". And the answer to the question of how to love God is "with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind". Augustine distinguishes between love/enjoyment (*frui*) for the sake of itself and love/use (*uti*) for the sake of something else. The most fundamental feature of the order of love is that God alone is to be loved in the sense of enjoyment, all other things are to be used. There are also two kinds of use: *misuse* – using the things of the world or the world itself to achieve some worldly purpose (Book I, Chapter 4, 42); *proper use*: we help both ourselves and the other person to achieve the highest purpose, the enjoyment of God. We have to have each other in the sense of support (use). For Augustine, man is essentially distinguished from other beings by his capacity to "enjoy God". Ultimate goal: happiness in the enjoyment of God, attachment (*adhaesio*) to God in love (Boros 2014, 62).

Chapter 32 of *On Christian Doctrine* ends thus: "The greatest possible reward is that we enjoy (*perfruamur*) him, and all of us who enjoy (*fruimur*) him, enjoy (*perfruamur*) each other in him." (p. 72) And God so loves us by using us, not by enjoying us. The conclusion of Gábor Boros is that the the Augustinian ladder of love is, after all, analogous to the Platonic ladder of beauty is. In Augustine's *On Christian Doctrine*, Chapter 8, from p. 46, we find the following: "Whatever bodily form comes before them [those who think of God as life], they are convinced that it lives or does not live through Life alone, and they esteem the living more highly than the non-living. (...) They value Life for its incomparable dignity more than the mass

it animates and gives soul to. That is why we try to see life itself (...). plant life without sensation is valued more than the sentient life of animals, but then even more the sentient (intelligent) life that is characteristic of humans, (...) and even before that (...) we put Life itself, which is the same as wisdom itself. (...) the unchangeably wise life is superior to the changeable life. (...) the rule of truth itself, by which the former is said to be superior, is immutable, and is not seen to be anywhere but above our own nature." The order of love expresses a radical alienation from the world, excluding direct relationship with the world and with one's neighbour. A problem arises: if happiness is projected into the absolute future, then the possibility of worldly improvement is lost: "improvement in the present becomes impossible". This is the problem of being-in-the-world, according to the Arendt 1929, 27.

"The idea that perfect self-reliance, realized in 'enjoyment', is to be expected in the future originates in Stoicism and Neoplatonism. But what is completely new is the idea of an absolute future, that we can bring the future projected in longing into the present and treat it as a point of reference. This is the future from which, as it were, we can return to reconcile with the present." (Biró-Kaszás 2005, 32, based on Arendt 1929, 27).

The basic problem remains that there is only an extrinsic connection between the expected (ordered) love and its object, which is contrary to the definition of love as desire, where the lover is intimately connected to the desired (loved) object.

3.2. Second part

II. In the second part, Arendt analyses *caritas*, the love of the transcendent, the love of what is beyond this world. Happiness is a concept based on a past outside the world, which memory rescues, presenting it as a possible future (Arendt 1929, 33), and thus desire can be directed towards it. The object of human desire is an idea in memory, an idea of the Creator "before" man (not derived from worldly experience). A happy life can only be achieved by reverting to one's origins (Arendt 1929, 35): "To revert to God is also to revert to one's own being, and the creature truly exists only insofar as it is reconnected to its own root. This relation, however, is not volitional, but arises from createdness." "The creature became what it is by its birth. The structure of its being is becoming and change. The particular mode of being of the created being is mutability, neither being nor non-being, but in-between." (Ibid.) The meaning of human existence is both outside and before itself, because man is not his own creator. Created existence exists only in insofar as it is reconnected to existence itself, and this withdrawal (the undertaking one's own createdness) is a constitutive element of human existence. The relation of

the creature to existence is the relation to the Creator. Being is eternal, it has preceded and is after beings, it is identical with the "from" (farthest past) and the "towards" (the farthest future) of being. Being, as origin and end, is the actual "comprehensive". The past and the absolute future that we can aspire to, which is identical with it, is made present by memory, which makes the beginning and the end interchangeable.

According to Arendt, this all-embracing being, into which man is growing and in which he forms his world, is identical with the being according to the Greek conception, the cosmos. However, the world is defined by the Christian context (Arendt 1929, 39). The essential relationships of the cosmos are: part and whole, harmony and fitting in. The whole is an eternal, unchanging, essential structure in which the parts exist for the sake of the whole and not for themselves, so that in this structure the particular mortality of human life is irrelevant (Arendt 1929, 40–42). According to Arendt, Plotinus was important to Augustine because he questioned man's position in the cosmos (Arendt 1929, 7, addendum to Part 2). Contrary to the cosmos, nothing in the world is created by chance, the events of the world are caused either by God or by human will. "The world is therefore, on the one hand, a divine creation, prior to man (Heaven and Earth), and, on the other hand, a human world, constituting itself through habitation and love." (Arendt 1929, 42.) The only reference to Heidegger in the dissertation is in relation to the concept of the world. (Ibid., note 2). Arendt also speaks of a kind of strangeness in relation to the world, in which it is given as a desert for man (Arendt 1929, 43). Man can choose not to be at home in the world, and to continually revert on God. Arendt 1929, 46: "Man as a creature has a structure of origination, of birth, and thus of impermanence, moving from the 'not yet' to the 'no longer'." It is the fact of death makes man pay attention to his origins (Arendt 1929, 48). "This 'back' is precisely from death: a death-directed inquiry into the Creator as Being" (Arendt 1929, 49). "The end of life, the end to which life is heading and from which it is reverted, is an end in two senses. On the one hand, it is the most radical indicator of our mortality. (...) On the other hand, it is the end where life ceases and for which it exists in the first place. In this sense, the end is the point where life borders on eternity." (Arendt 1929, 49–50). Life goes on from being to being, and so the specific course of individual life becomes secondary (Arendt 1929, 52). Ultimately, the beginning and the end are interchangeable (Arendt 1929, 52–53, based on *The City of God* 13, 10).

II.2. The title of the second chapter of part two is *Caritas and cupiditas* (which is also the title of the second chapter of the first part). The two concepts indicated in the title differ not only in their subject matter, but also in the act of choice. For Augustine, the love of the world is naturally given, but the love of God is based on choice (the choice to live in *caritas*), preceded by the Creator's own choice, his grace. The realization of this

reconnection is preceded and made possible by a choice from outside the world, by divine grace (Arendt 1929, 54). In this way, man's worldly isolation and individuality are removed; man allows the world to disappear (in the progress towards God, in the progress towards becoming like God, in living according to God's example). Although man is chosen out of the world, he is nevertheless of the world, and therefore always separated from pure being. He can therefore never grasp himself as a whole. The requirement to live for God, and the knowledge that he is incapable on his own to fulfil this requirement, reveals man's dependence on God. This is expressed concretely in the law, but also in the impossibility of complying with the law (Arendt 1929, 56). The law demands what the creature refuses to do on its own, that is, to move towards its own existence, to acknowledge its creatureliness, that it lives its life as a creature in the world, in a particular mode of questioning. The law also says concerning sin, "Thou shalt not covet it!" Covetousness is the pursuit of a wrong "before", when man, in his questioning search for his own unchanging existence, goes no further than the world into which he has been created. "In loving the world, he reconstitutes his world and himself as belonging to the world – he transforms himself into a lover of the world, makes the world his own homeland and abolishes its desert-like character (*On the Gospel of John* 28.9 and *Homily on the First Epistle of John* 1.7). The basis of desire is one's own will, that is, to do something independently. Thus, man forgets about the absolute supremacy of God – he forgets himself in the world and in habit. Habit is man's second nature, in it he has surrendered and given himself to the world. In the world created by creatures, the individual human being is not standing isolated in the face of his own 'whence', but lives in a world created in common with others." (Arendt 1929, 60. Biró-Kaszás 2005, 36).

Habit is the eternal yesterday without a future. One can only become alienated from habit when one realizes one's own roots (Arendt 1929, 58–59). Man's existence, constructed by himself, according to his will, made reliable and predictable by habit, is threatened by the ultimate future, death. The desiring man is afraid of death. The role of death is precisely to reveal one's own true origin (*On Christian Doctrine* 3.15, *Against Julian* 4. 103., *Homily on the First Epistle of John* 1.7). The opposite of habit (and the false security it provides) is the conscience called by law, which sends us forward to the Creator. The nature of the secular man is shaped by the "foreign language" of other people, influenced from the outside, but conscience accuses from the inside. Habit subjects man to the judgment of the world. Conscience leads him to the vision of God (*coram Deo*) as his true root. God is the sole judge of right and wrong. "Conscience makes the world a desert again and banishes man from the world of habit." (Arendt 1929, 60) The Creator makes demands on the creature. Arendt points out that while the Christian God is a creative and omnipotent God, He is also a

personal God who has the right over his creature and the existential possibilities proposed by its own will.

Reconnecting is not something the creature can do by itself. "The law, by pointing out the sin it cannot destroy, provokes a new turning toward God. Now, this is no longer a mere reconnection, but a direct request for help. God does not act as creator, but as a giver and a helper. His help is grace, which only the humble can obtain." (Arendt 1929, 65) This turning-towards and love known to the humble is *dilectio*, in which the creature is re-created, freed from his sinfulness, his being-in-the-world. In note 1, Arendt writes: "For Augustine, '*coram Deo*', understood as God's continuing authority, can already be given in the human condition, and Augustine characterizes this as submission to the law." Love as *caritas* is the acceptance of divine grace and help, which makes it possible to fulfil the law, but also the renunciation of the world and self-denial. In self-denial (the denial of himself as being of the world), the creature relates to itself as God relates to him: he hates in itself that its free will can give its being of the world independent meaning and loves its own creatureliness (Arendt 1929, 67–68, *On the Gospel of John* 87.4 and 110.6).

II.3. In the third chapter of the second part, *Dilectio proximi* (Neighbour love), the question arises: how can the role of the neighbour be understood in a love that is both divinely inspired and self-denying? How can I, who am attached to God and separated from the world, still live in the world?" (Arendt 1929, 68. 2) Paul links love for one's neighbour to the individual and to the care for one's own spiritual salvation. There are two parts to the command to love one's neighbour: on the one hand, one must love one's neighbour as God loves, and on the other, as one loves oneself. According to God's love, man is in relationship with another only as a creature of God. This relationship has little effect on the lives of the neighbours since the bond of neighbour love is a denial of self and of particular attachments on both sides. This self-consuming (non-sensual) love extends to all human beings without distinction, while leaving the world a desert and fulfilling isolation. The other aspect is to love your neighbour as yourself and there is a denial involved here as well. The negation of the other is also a kind of recognition of the real existence inherent in the other (Biró-Kaszás 2005, 39). Neighbour love, therefore, is also denying; denying the other in his concrete worldliness, but not forgetting him or her: I want you to be (*volo ut sis*), and I want to take you to God (Arendt 1929, 71). A Christian can love all people, because each person is of equal value in the sense that they provide an opportunity to return to God. "The lover clinging to God through the beloved, in whom he finds the meaning of his own existence and also of his love." (Arendt 1929, 72, based *Confessions* 4.18). We love not our neighbour, but love itself (according to *The City of God* 11.27).

3.3. The third part: Vita socialis (Social life)

So far, the concepts of neighbour and other have not been give substance. Arendt points out that, for Augustine, the origin of being is different depending on whether he is looking at man as an individual or man as a social being. As a social being, he speaks of two communities: a *community of faith*, which claims the whole person, and a *secular community*, which focuses on the commonality of a single definition of being. But faith keeps the individual in the isolation of *coram Deo*, nor can a common object of faith create communion. Faith, according to Arendt, can be interpreted in two ways: 1. faith is the relation of the individual to the question of his own existence, 2. it is linked to history, to the past: to the death of Christ and to the common descent from Adam. "The kinship based on Adam is the essential definition of human existence, which is not the identity of qualities, but the identity of a situation, of destiny – which is mortality. The equality and commonality of human beings, the multifaceted interdependence on fellow human beings and not on God is based on mortality. Their community is the earthly city (*On the Gospel of John* 8.8., *The City of God* 14.1., 12.22., 15.1, *Confessions* 10.6)." Man is indirectly connected to existence through procreation. Human society is both a fact of nature and a historical product; man is at home in the world according both to his history and his nature, according to Arendt (Arendt 1929, 78-82). The historical conception focuses on the equality between people: "Love is due to all members of the human race, either in return for mutual affection, or simply because he or she is the bearer of our common nature." (Augustine *Epistle* 130. 13) This love is a manifestation of interdependence (Arendt 1929, 82): "But how is the equality which, according to Christianity, is rooted in the before (*ante*), in sin, to be considered obligatory for the believer who finds his or her original dependence outside the world, in the Creator? Or how can we be bound by the past, which must be completely eradicated?" The revelation of God in Christ has made it possible for man to reconnect with his own origin. Faith, as existence in the vision of God, recalls the individual from his worldly relations. Salvation has come to all people in this world he founded. Without salvation, the individual does not have the freedom to withdraw into himself and separate himself from the world he has created, i.e., he does not have the freedom of choice. Based on *The City of God* (15.1), Arendt says that "the potential strangeness of Christians in the world is always alienation, because it is homeliness in the world that is taken for granted" (Arendt 1929, 83).

Equality with others is made evident by the commandment to love one's neighbour. The other is to be loved, not only because of the sin that causes equality, but also because of grace. Either because he has already received grace, or because the neighbour is like the Christian was before his conversion. The commandment of love calls for humility in the face of

grace. It is only the past that makes it possible to understand this obligatory equality, and obligatory love, of all human beings. (Arendt 1929, 84). The world fixes the past, original kinship, and sin. Redemption means redemption from the common participation in original sin. Everyone is saved together. In pre-God existence, everyone is equally guilty. (After redemption, death is no longer something given by nature, but the punishment of sin.) The world takes the past for granted and only the Christian experiences the past as sinful. It is important, however, that "in the perpetuation of the world the past retains its right, and it is against the world (not simply without it) that salvation has come to men" (Arendt 1929, 84).

Alienation from the world is given new meaning by divine grace. This is the basis for the creation of the new city (the city of God). "Alienation is the basis of a new Christ-following community, which replaces interdependence with mutual love (the self-evident nature of the relationship with the other is lost). (...) When, through faith, individual existence becomes definite, then the existence of the other individual becomes manifested in equality – and the other becomes at the same time a brother. It is in this fraternity that caritas appears, which is also a necessity, because the individual, relying on himself, cannot separate himself from the existing world." (Arendt 1929, 86, Biró-Kaszás 2005, 42).

Around p. 89 of the *Liebesbegriff...*, another important concept appears: *danger*, which applies to the individual and not to the human race. The worldy life of Christians is "a life in danger" because the world is an objectification of the past. Arendt analyses the Augustinian concept of eternal death, or the second death, on the basis of *The City of God* 14.1 and 13.2. The first death (as the end of life) can be overcome after redemption and thus become a bridge to eternity, but it can also become eternal death. The unity of men is no longer based on descent, but on imitation in leading one's neighbour towards God and saving him from eternal death. Arendt 1929, 87–88: Love in the city of God extends to every single person, but only as long as he or she can be the object of grace. *We do not choose our neighbour, he or she is our gift; in him or her we love not himself or herself, but the grace of God.* "Love comes from the idea of being in your own danger. This danger, the possibility of sinking back into sin, is experienced by the conscience in the vision of God, that is, in perfect isolation. Questions about the other are not about the other's worldly significance, but about the other's existence before God. The other is thus seen in the love of the other in complete isolation. Thus, in the city of God, the human is not dissolved into a multitude of individuals" (Arendt 1929, 89, Biró-Kaszás 2005, 43).

Hence, man is different depending on whether he understands himself as isolated or dependent. The encounter with the other can only happen because I belong to the human race, descended from Adam, but only in the isolation of *coram Deo* does the other become a neighbour

(detached from mutual dependence). The possibility of *coram Deo* isolation is a fact of human history and is therefore itself historical. According to Augustine's philosophy of history, before Christ's redemption there was only the human race as determined by Adam. And it was the fact of redemption that made it possible to break away from the history of the human race, from the bonds established by procreation.

4. Conclusions

To summarise the main points of the dissertation, it can be said that the key concepts (Greek and Christian elements) of Augustinian ontology are permanence and mutability, Creator and creation, existence (eternal present) and time (the temporal is secondary), origin and memory, will and desire.

In Arendt's interpretation of Augustine, the future and the past meet in the timeless present of memory, in the *nunc stans*. The creature is connected to being through the "presentational" capacity of memory. In later works, the locus of the meeting of past and future is transformed into the public space where immortal words and deeds are given a place.

4.1. Arendt's criticism of Augustine (in the dissertation):

Arendt criticizes that, in Augustine, neighbour love does not refer to the individuality of the other. The fellow human being is only relevant to me as an object of divine grace; I do not love him for his own sake. The same is true of the world. Man's authentic way of being is *amator Dei*, not *amator mundi*. According to Gábor Kovács, in Part I, love appears as longing (*cupiditas*, *concupiscentia*) (among its many forms, passionate love also appears). "Desire arises from man's own inadequacy; he desires what he lacks. Desire tries to erase the distance between lover and beloved." *Cupiditas* is important because it not only connects man with his world, but also constitutes and makes him act. "The desire of the lover of the world is action that creates and sustains what it is directed towards, that is, the world itself." This is the true meaning of *amo – volo ut sis*. The question is: what is the role of neighbour love? According to the divine order of love (ordinata dilectio), the world and our neighbour cannot be loved for themselves, for only God can be loved for Himself, while the love of others is derivative and instrumental (see the difference between *frui*/enjoyment and *uti*/use; only God can be truly enjoyed). What will become of the human world, constituted by human activity and the love directed towards it? Is the world to be loved as an object of divine grace and not for itself?

To briefly summarize the conclusion of Arendt's dissertation on the Augustinian *caritas*. For Augustine, the theological concept of neighbour

love leads to the denial of both self and neighbour, primarily because it is essentially preoccupied with the "love of God" or "love for God" (Arendt 1929, 67-68). In the case of the theological concept of neighbour love, unlike in the case of the concept of friendship, it is not possible to choose the beloved. The de-individualisation and de-historicisation of the other takes placed in exchange for the standardised equality and uniformity with which everyone is treated. Therefore, the theological concept of neighbour love cannot be the basis for the relevance and importance of the other and is incapable of establishing the public *vinculum*/bond in social life (Arendt 1929, 25–27, 55–68). Arendt's argument against the failure of the biblical concept of love (in doing justice to historicity, individuality, and the individual needs of the neighbour) can nevertheless be viewed as an exaggeration. See, e.g., the arguments of Shin Chiba 1995, 505–535.

4.2. Criticisms of Arendt's dissertation:

Jaspers, as Arendt's dissertation supervisor, considered the dissertation somewhat arbitrary, because it could not provide sufficient philological support for Arendt's distinction of the concepts of love from the Augustinian texts. Jaspers was not fully satisfied with the dissertation. Experts and analysts also condemned both Arendt and her advisor, because they are not the real experts of patristic philosophy. Arendt's relationship with Augustine is dismissive and prejudiced (Brechtken 1975, 185). But Arendt consciously does not deal with Augustine as a clergyman; she was only interested in him as a thinker in this work. (Young-Bruehl 1982, 75–76).

4.3. Arendt's later works

In Arendt's later works, the problem of love is relegated to the background, because she did not consider love to be of a political nature in general. The Arendtian critique of the biblical concept of love is partly due to the general view that *agape* and *caritas* can be seen as a kind of emotion, a passion, like romantic love or brotherhood. Her critique is also based on the fact that the acosmic or unworldly tendency of *agape* is reinforced by its otherworldliness, which derives from its religious basis. The love of the world, the *dilectio (amor) mundi*, which is already prominent in the dissertation, is the real essence of what Arendt's mature work, *The Human Condition* has to say, and it is presented as a positive in this late work. The problem of love appears in the second chapter of *The Human Condition*, where Arendt analyses the relationship between the *private realm* and the *public realm*. Again, she starts with Augustine and continues the train of thought of the dissertation. Here, the Christian community based on love of neighbour (*dilectio proximi*) constitutes a specific substitute for the

world, or a pseudo-world, for the believers living in it. The community of believers is based on charity/*caritas*, which constitutes a relationship system (in-between) between the members. According to Arendt, this is characterised by worldlessness, i.e., it is not a real public sphere. But why is *caritas* unable to establish the public sector? Arendt sees this structure, the community of believers, as following a more family-like model. The relationship between family members is not political but even anti-political in nature. "For love, although it is one of the rarest occurrences in human lives, indeed possesses... an unequalled clarity of vision for the disclosure of who, precisely because it is unconerned to the point of total unworldliness with what loved person may be, with his qualities and short coming, no less then in his achievements, failings, transgressions. Love, by reason of its passion, destroys the in-between which relates us to and separates us from others...Love, by its very nature is unworldly, and it is for this reason rather than its rarity, that it is not apolitical but antipolitical, perhaps the most powerful of all antipolitical human forces." (In *The Human Condition*. 2nd edition, 1998, 242).

A true public sphere can only grow out of intersubjective relationships striving for excellence.

Arendt thus transforms the usually negative meaning of the Augustinian notion of *amor mundi* (as *cupiditas* or the pursuit of temporal things), which she has already dealt with in the dissertation, into a positive one, as the passionless yet devoted commitment of citizens to the well-being of the world. The "love of the world" is usually negative in Augustine. E.g., *The Homilies of the First Epistle of John* II, 14: The love of the world makes the soul unfaithful, the love of the Creator of the world makes the soul pure. But Augustine also sometimes speaks of the correct form of *amor mundi*: "I am not saying that the creature is unlovable, and not to be loved, but the love of the creature, if it is directed at the Creator, becomes charity and compassion, not covetousness and greed." (*On the Trinity*, IX, 13). *Amor mundi*, as the public bond of citizens, remains the principle that inspires action, the driving force that propels them into the adventure of the common world. The "love of the world" is not merely a voluntary commitment to the well-being of the world, but also a kind of self-perception, and a way of relating oneself to the surrounding world. Citizens immediately realize that what binds them together is the world they share, the world they enter as they are born and leave, in order to die, at the proper time, to hand it over to their heirs. (Arendt 1998, 55.) Later, in the section on *action* of the *Human Condition*, the problem of love reappears in the context of *forgiveness*. Here, love, paradoxically, precisely because of its worldlessness, can become the basis for forgiveness, which is essential for the survival of the public sphere. For love uniquely possesses the power of self-revelation and the capacity to reveal a unique identity (who); this is possible precisely because love is indifferent to the point of total worldlessness to the beloved's communal identity (what). It

does not care about its faults, achievements, mistakes, and sins." (p. 6) It is well known that Arendt emphasized the political aspect of forgiveness (aphesis), because forgiveness, although a basic form of agape, allows the community to reorder itself. She identified the specific political function of forgiveness with its liberating power: it lifts us out of the unresolvable chaos of revenge, so that a new community of coexistence can be built on a whole new basis. Forgiveness can preserve the new, unexpected, and original character of the action, it can break the vicious circle of revenge and automatic reaction.

In general, the late Arendt's position is that love tends to exclude the outside world and, as a private emotion, is an entity opposed to politics. "I am not moved by any 'love' of this sort, and for two reasons: I have never in my life 'loved' any people or collective group, neither the German people, the French, the Americans, nor the working class or anything of that sort. I indeed love only my friends, and the only kind of love I know of and believe in is the love of persons. Moreover, this 'love of the Jews' would appear to me, since I am myself Jewish, as something rather suspect.... Generally speaking, the role of the 'heart' in politics seems to me altogether questionable" (Arendt 1978b. 246).

The conclusion of her mature works is that all love (with the exception of friendship and the ancient Greek desire for immortality on earth) is non-political/apolitical, even anti-political. The critique of apoliticality applies only to emotional love (pity, fraternity, compassion, and romantic love). This is a subjective, rather modern love, understood as a mere emotion. (The question is whether there is also a form of understanding love as an objective, public bond that is intrinsic to the human condition.) Friendship and the Greek desire for earthly immortality are not necessarily emotional; they should not be considered as such forms of love. An inner human attitude can be judged political if it is compatible with the principle of solidarity (as a criterion): to participate in reason and in the general (impartiality, *sensus communis*, extended ideality as attributes of judgement and defining characteristics of *amor mundi*), to engage dispassionately in common and public affairs.

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